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PROBLEMS OF REPRESENTATATION OF AIR




T HE SCOPE OF GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY for air-
craft accidents that occur as a result of mid-air collisions
and the problems of representing air traffic controllers in the
resulting suits against the United States are the subject of
this article. Any consideration of the defense of air traffic con-
trollers and the potential liability of the United States for
their negligence must commence with an understanding of the
nature and extent of the duties owed by air traffic controllers
to those who use the system. Therefore, this article is divided
into three sections which delineate the various types of re-
sponsibility attributable to the United States for mid-air colli-
sions and the difficulties of defending air traffic controllers in
such accidents.
The first section of this article addresses the scope of the
duties and responsibilities of air traffic controllers in avoiding
mid-air collisions that occur in Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)
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conditions.' The second section of this article discusses the li-
ability of air traffic controllers for mid-air collisions that occur
in a Terminal Control Area (TCA)2 or a Terminal Radar Ser-
vice Area (TRSA).s The final section of this article deals with
the scope of the duties and responsibilities of air traffic con-
trollers to prevent mid-air collisions that occur in Visual
Flight Rules (VFR) conditions."
IFR conditions present the greatest potential liability of the
United States. There is some potential liability in TCA and
TRSA situations. The least exposure to liability exists under
VFR conditions.
The Federal Aviation Regulations provide two distinct
methods of operating aircraft. First, under IFR, which must
be used when the weather conditions are below established
standards, 5 aircraft proceed along routes at altitudes re-
quested by the pilot and authorized by air traffic control. Con-
trollers determine the distance between aircraft by applying
relevant provisions of the air traffic control manuals.' This
distance is necessary during IFR conditions because the pilots
are generally flying in clouds and unable to see each other.
Second, under VFR conditions pilots can see outside the air-
craft and fly by visual rather than instrument references.'
The FAA Instrument Flight Rules are codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.115-.127
(1982). Instrument Flight Rules conditions exist when the ceiling and/or visibility are
below certain minimums set by the FAA. In such conditions pilots are required to fly
by reference to instruments rather than outside visibility. J. FoE & D. CRANE, AIR-
CRAFT TECHNICAL DICTIONARY 97 (1978).
2 A terminal control area is a "[c]ontrolled airspace extending upward from the
surface or higher to specified altitudes, within which all aircraft are subject to operat-
ing rules and pilot and equipment requirements specified in FAR Part 91" FAA Or-
der 7110.65C, Air Traffic Control, app. 4, 13 (1982).
3 A terminal radar service area is the "[a]irspace surrounding designated airports
wherein ATC [air traffic control] provides radar vectoring, sequencing, and separation
on a fulltime basis for all IFR [instrument flight rule] and participating VFR [visual
flight rule] aircraft." FAA Order 7110.65C, Air Traffic Control, app. 4, 39 (1982).
' The FAA Visual Flight Rules are codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.105-.109 (1982). Vis-
ual Flight Rules conditions exist when weather conditions are equal to or greater than
vusual flight rules requirements. FAA Order 7110.65C, Air Traffic Control, app. 4.43
(1982).
' Basic VFR weather minimums, 14 C.F.R. § 91.105 (1982). See also, supra note 1.
* See generally FAA Order 7110.65C, Air Traffic Control (1982). See also FAA, AIR-
MAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL, 1-49 (1982).
' See supra note 2.
REPRESENTATION OF CONTROLLERS
Mid-air collisions often occur in "enroute" and "terminal"
air traffic environments.8 Enroute mid-air collisions generally
involve at least one aircraft on an IFR flight plan and may
expose the United States to liability.9 Aircraft with or without
flight plans may be involved in terminal environment mid-air
collisions.10 The Air Route Traffic Control Center is the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration (FAA) facility involved in en-
route collisions. The control tower, approach control and de-
parture control are the FAA facilities involved in terminal
collisions.
Although this article focuses on the responsibilities and lia-
bilities of the United States, pilots using the system also have
correlative duties and responsibilities. The most important
concept of VFR flight is pilot vigilance to "see and avoid"
other aircraft. Such vigilance is especially important in the vi-
cinity of airports where there is a greater likelihood of en-
countering other aircraft."
I. THE DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF AIR TRAFFIC
CONTROLLERS RELATED TO AVOIDANCE OF INSTRUMENT FLIGHT
RULES MID-AIR COLLISIONS
A. Separation of Aircraft as a Primary Duty
An analysis of the exposure of the United States to liablility
resulting from amid-air collision must start with the proposi-
tion that the first priority of all air traffic controllers is the
8 Enroute and terminal environments are generally those in which approach con-
trol service or airport traffic control service is provided. FAA Order 7110.65C, Air
Traffic Control, app. 4, 15, 39 (1982).
9 See Cattaro v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Va. 1964)(A Lock-
heed Electra L-188, flying IFR, was involved in a near miss with a B-47 bomber flying
VFR).
10 See Allen v. United States, 370 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Mo. 1973) (A Cessna 150
flying under VFR collided with an Ozark DC-9 flying in accordance with its IFR
clearance).
11 Flight Rules, 14 C.F.R. § 91.67(a) (1982) sets forth the concept of "see and
avoid." This concept requires that vigilance shall be maintained by each person oper-
ating an aircraft, when weather conditions permit, regardless of whether the opera-
tion is conducted under IFR or VFR. See also FAA Advisory Circular 90.48B, (Sept.
5, 1980).
1982]
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separation of aircraft. In air traffic control parlance separation
of aircraft is a term of art. In its broadest sense, it means
keeping one aircraft from hitting another aircraft.
Separation is required by the Air Traffic Control Manual"2
in the following situations: (1) between IFR aircraft; (2) be-
tween all aircraft in TCA and Stage III TRSA airspace; and
(3) on or over the runway surface of an airport regardless of
the weather conditions.' s If a pilot strictly adhering to an IFR
flight plan collides with another aircraft, then the United
States may be partially responsible for the collision. These
cases are particularly difficult to defend because, as stated
previously, separation of aircraft is recognized as the first pri-
ority of the air traffic controllers.
In one early case, Cattaro v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. 4 the
court held the government responsible for an IFR mid-air col-
lision between a B-47 bomber and a Northwest Airlines air-
craft. Although the military aircraft was proceeding under
VFR, the air traffic controllers were responsible for putting
the planes on a collision course. One controller monitored the
Northwest airline on radar. Another controller observed the
two converging airplanes on his radar scope for forty-five
seconds without advising either pilot of the impending dan-
ger."' The court reasoned that if the controllers had familiar-
ized themselves with the recorded flight plans of the two air-
craft or had conferred with each other, the collision could
have been avoided.16
Simlilarly, in State of Maryland v. United States,7 the
United States was held liable for the failure of the air traffic
controllers at the Washington Air Route Traffic Control
Center to observe on radar the close proximity of a govern-
I FAA Order 7110.65C Traffic Control 22 (1982) provides: "Give first priority to
separation of aircraft as required in this handbook and to the issuance of safety ad-
visories. Give second priority to other services that are required but do not involve
separation of aircraft. Give third priority to additional services to the extent
possible."
's See FAA, AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL 1-52 (1982).
1 236 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Va. 1964).
I ld. at 895.
I d..
257 F. Supp. 768 (D. Md. 1966).
REPRESENTATION OF CONTROLLERS
ment airplane to another aircraft and to transmit a timely
warning. The government plane was flying under VFR while
the other plane was flying under IFR. Commenting on the du-
ties of the air traffic controllers at air route traffic control cen-
ters, the court stated that the controllers have a duty to ob-
serve and detect on the radar scope any VFR traffic in
addition to giving appropriate clearances and information
from time to time to IFR aircraft. 5 Therefore, the controllers
were negligent in failing to warn the IFR pilot of the impend-
ing danger. 19
Another case in which the United States was held liable for
air traffic controller negligence is Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v.
United States.2 0 Prior to the mid-air collision between an Al-
legheny Airlines DC-9 aircraft and a Piper Cherokee aircraft,
the controllers failed to detect the Piper Cherokee on radar
and warn the DC-9.21 The Piper Cherokee, which was not
equipped with a transponder, was being flown on a VFR flight
plan by a student pilot.2 The Allegheny aircraft was on an
IFR flight plan enroute to Indianapolis and was being moni-
tored by the Indianapolis approach control radar position.
Although the controller testified at trial that he did not see
a target for the Piper Cherokee on his radar scope, the court
concluded that the aircraft should have, and did appear on his
scope in sufficient time to enable him to warn the Allegheny
18 Id. at 772.
19 Id. The court determined that this situation was somewhat analogous to that in
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) in which "suit was. brought
against the Government for damage to a vessel sustained by reason of negligence in
the maintenance of a lighthouse." The Supreme Court held that while the Govern-
ment was under no legal obligation to maintain a lighthouse or undertake a light-
house service, once it had exercised its discretion to do so, it was obligated to use due
care in operating the lighthouse. Therefore, the Government "undertook" the duty of
separation of aircraft by providing air traffic services and thereby was chargeable with
the negligence of its employees. 257 F. Supp. at 773.
:0 420 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D. Ind. 1976).
I d. at *1341.
I2 d. at 1346. A transponder is "[t]he airborne radar beacon receiver/transmitter
portion of the Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System (ATCRBS) which automati-
cally receives radio signals from interrogators on the ground, and selectively replies
with specific reply pulse or pulse group only to those interrogations being received on
the mode to which it is set to respond." FAA Order 7110.65C, Air Traffic Control,
app. 4, 41 (1982).
1982]
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aircraft of the danger.23 Additionally the court determined
that there was no justification for the controller's failure to
see the target.2' Allegheny Airlines was barred, however, from
recovering from the United States because its crew was con-
tributorily negligent.2
As the discussion of the foregoing cases illustrates, United
States' liability for controller negligence typically has been
premised on the failure of a controller to warn either or both
pilots of controlled aircraft of proximate traffic. While courts
have not held that the duty to warn pilots of controlled air-
craft of proximate traffic is absolute or that it makes the gov-
ernment an insurer of safety, they have held that due care
must be exercised in discharging the duty.26 What constitutes
due care in each case necessarily depends in large part on the
risk involved.
B. The Air Traffic Control Manual Definition of the
Controller's Duty To Separate Aircraft
Generally, the scope of an air traffic controller's duty to sep-
arate aircraft is defined in applicable FAA air traffic control
manuals.27 Because a manual cannot anticipate all situations,
controllers are expected to exercise their best judgment when
confronted with situations not covered in the manual. When a
controller is found to have been negligent, the finding gener-
ally is based on the determination that either the provisions
of the manual were not followed or a controller failed to exer-
cise due care when confronted with a situation where he knew,
or should have known, that an aircraft was in a position of
danger.28
Consistent with the foregoing, in Rudelson v. United
States29 the court stated that "it is well settled that air traffic
" 420 F. Supp. at 1349.
24 Id.
" Id. at 1351.
" Rudelson v. United States, 602 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1979); United Airlines, Inc. v.
Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
a, FAA Order 7110.65C, Air Traffic Control (1982).
See supra text accompanying notes 20-25.
2 602 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1979).
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controllers' duties are not limited to the tasks prescribed by
FAA manuals." 30 The case involved a mid-air collision be-
tween a Cessna 150 and a Piper Colt about a mile south of the
airport traffic control tower in Santa Monica, California. The
Cessna was executing training flight touch-and-go landings on
Runway 21. The Piper entered the Santa Monica airport traf-
fic area without establishing radio communications with the
tower. The Piper and Cessna collided on the downwind leg.
The five FAA employees on duty in the tower did not see the
Piper. The court, after noting that the air traffic controllers'
duties are not limited to those contained in the FAA manuals,
concluded that the controllers had a duty to monitor the
Cessna's position while it was in the vicinity of the entry cor-
ridor to the traffic pattern31
Similarly, in Allen v. United States,2 the court stated that
the duties of an FAA air traffic controller are not confined to
those detailed in FAA manuals. The case involved a mid-air
collision between a Cessna 150 and an Ozark Airline DC-9.
Before the collision the Cessna pilot had been cleared to enter
a right downwind leg3 3 for Runway 17. He did not acknowl-
edge, however, the clearance transmission and headed in a
southeasterly direction toward the extension of Runway 17.
The DC-9, which was on a training flight, entered a right base
leg"' for Runway 17. The air traffic controller saw that the
Cessna was about to turn on final"5 in front of the DC-9. He
instructed the Cessna to proceed staight across the final and
3o Id. at 1329.
31 Id. The court found that under especially dangerous conditions, controllers must
take steps beyond those set forth in the manuals if such steps are necessary to ensure
the safety of pilots and passengers. A person is not necessarily free from negligence
just because he "may have literally complied with safety statutes or rules." Id.
32 370 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
3 A downwind leg is "[a] flight path parallel to the landing runway in the direction
opposite to landing. The downwind leg normally extends between the crosswind leg
and the base leg." FAA Order 7110.65C, Air Traffic Control, app. 4, 41 (1982).
3, A base leg is "[a] flight path at right angles to the landing runway off its ap-
proach end. The base leg normally extends from the downwind leg to the intersection
of the extended runway centerline." Id.
" Final is "[clommonly used to mean that an aircraft is on the final approach
course or is aligned with a landing area." Id. at 16.
1982]
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enter a left base leg.3 Soon after the controller's transmission
the collision occurred. After observing that air traffic control-
lers have a duty to prevent collisions, the court held that the
air traffic controller was negligent in authorizing the two air-
craft to fly a collision course.3
A review of reported cases that discuss a controller's duty to
separate aircraft indicates that no court has found a controller
negligent for failing to take action beyond the scope of duties
defined in the FAA manual unless the controller was aware
that the aircraft was in a position of danger. Courts have con-
cluded uniformly that failure to warn constitutes negligence
where controllers were aware, or should have been aware, that
an aircraft was in a position of danger.38 Clearly, these conclu-
sions are based on a determination that the controller failed
to exercise due care.
II. MID-AIR COLLISIONS IN TERMINAL CONTROL AREAS AND
TERMINAL RADAR SERVICE AREAS
A Terminal Control Area (TCA) consists of "controlled air-
space extending upward from the surface, or higher to speci-
fied altitudes within which all aircraft are subject to operating
rules." 9 The FAA has established TCA's at certain airports
with high density traffic because of the recognized need to
maintain operational safety near busy airports.40
Duties imposed by the FAA on air traffic controllers are
more stringent in Terminal Radar Service Areas (TRSA) with
Stage III Service and TCA's. Except for aircraft equipment
requirements, the major difference between a TRSA and a
TCA is that participation in the former is voluntary, while
participation in the latter is mandatory.41
TRSA is defined in the pilot/controller glossary contained
in Part I of the Airman's Information Manual as the airspace
00 See supra note 34.
07 370 F. Supp. at 1000.
30 United Airlines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951
(1964).
' FAA AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL 1-24 (1982).
40 14 C.F.R. § 91.90 (1982).
4' FAA AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL 1-32 (1982).
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surrounding certain designated airports wherein Air Traffic
Control provides radar vectoring, sequencing and separation
on a full-time basis for all IFR and participating VFR air-
craft.4 This service is referred to as Stage III Service. 3
VFR aircraft operating in a TRSA Stage III environment
are given Stage III Services unless the aircraft requests other-
wise. Part I of the Airman's Information Manual states that
"the purpose of this service is to provide separation between
all participating VFR aircraft and all IFR aircraft operating
within the airspace defined as the Terminal Radar Service
Area (TRSA). ' '44 The purpose of the TCA is the same as that
of the Stage III Service in a TRSA.
The defense of a lawsuit arising out of the mid-air collision
between two participating aircraft within the boundaries of ei-
ther a Stage III TRSA or a TCA is difficult. One of the factors
making the defense more difficult is that any collisions indi-
cate that the objective for establishing TRSA's and TCA's has
not been achieved. A second factor making the defense more
difficult is that the towers providing the services in a TRSA or
TCA are equipped with Britescope radar.45 The availability of
radar makes it easier for air traffic controllers to locate air-
craft and, to some extent determine the horizontal separation.
Because a controller's ability to provide separation is greatly
enhanced by the availability of radar, it is more difficult to
absolve the United States of liability.
Generally, the government asserts the following defenses in
lawsuits stemming from mid-air collisions that occurred
within either a Stage III TRSA or a TCA: (1) the collision
occurred with at least one aircraft not participating in the
Stage III Service of the TRSA; (2) one or both of the aircraft
failed to follow its air traffic control clearance or instruction;
42 Id.
41 Id. at 1-5.
" Id. at 1-32.
" A radar is "[a] device which by measuring the time interval between transmis-
sion and reception of radio pulses and correlating the angular orientation of the radi-
ated antenna beam or beams in azimuth and/or elevation provides information on
range, azimuth and/or elevation of objects in the path of the transmitted pulses."
FAA Order 7110.65C, Air Traffic Control, app. 4, 31 (1982).
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(3) one or both of the aircraft entered the TRSA or TCA
without communicating with the appropriate FAA facility; or
(4) the aircraft were providing their own separation and failed
to do so properly.
The duty of pilots to "see and avoid" other aircraft is not
reduced or abrogated while operating in a TRSA or TCA. Part
I of the Airman's Information Manual provides:
4. PILOTS RESPONSIBILTY: THESE PROGRAMS ARE
NOT TO BE INTERPRETED AS RELIEVING PILOTS OF
THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES TO SEE AND AVOID OTHER
TRAFFIC OPERATING IN BASIC VFR WEATHER CON-
DITIONS, TO MAINTAIN APPROPRIATE TERRAIN AND
OBSTRUCTION CLEARANCE, OR TO REMAIN IN
WEATHER CONDITIONS EQUAL TO OR BETTER THAN
THE MIMIMA REQUIRED BY FAR 91.105. WHENEVER
COMPLIANCE WITH AN ASSIGNED ROUTE, HEADING
AND/OR ALTITUDE IS LIKELY TO COMPROMISE SAID
PILOT RESPONSIBILITY RESPECTING TERRAIN AND
OBSTRUCTION CLEARANCE AND WEATHER MINIMA,
APPROACH CONTROL SHOULD BE SO ADVISED AND A
REVISED CLEARANCE OR INSTRUCTION OBTAINED. 6
In Colorado Flying Academy v. United States47 the United
States was absolved of liability for a mid-air collision that oc-
curred in a TCA because both pilots were found negligent in
failing to "see and avoid" each other. The case arose out of
the mid-air collision between a Piper Seneca and a Beech Bo-
nanza west of Denver, Colorado.48
Initially, the court determined that the Denver TCA had
been designed negligently.49 The FAA airspace specialist re-
sponsible for the design had not provided a "buffer zone" 0
between TCA and non-TCA traffic and also had failed to in-
clude the back-course Instrument Landing System (ILS)
46 FAA, AIRMAN'S INFORMATION MANUAL, 1-33 (1982).
4 506 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Colo. 1981).
48 Id. at 1222.
" Id. at 1227.
8 The court found that the FAA should have established procedures providing for
a minimum buffer zone vertical separation of 500 feet between TCA and non-TCA
traffic. Id.
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within the TCA airspace. 51 Government liability, however, was
precluded because the TCA had been designed pursuant to
established FAA guidelines and thus, fell within the "discre-
tionary function exception" to the Federal Tort Claims Act.2
Additionally, the court concluded that even if the design of
the TCA had not fallen within the "discretionary function ex-
ception", the negligence of the United States was not the "pri-
mary cause" of the mid-air collision." The court explicitly re-
jected the plaintiff's arguments that "see and avoid" was an
outmoded concept, and held that the pilot's failure to "see
and avoid" each other was the "primary cause.''
The United States was held liable, however, in Universal
Aviation Underwriters v. United States.55 The case arose out
of a mid-air collision within the Denver TCA between a
DeHavilland Twin Otter and a Beechcraft Bonanza. Evidence
produced during trial indicated that shortly before the colli-
sion occurred, an air traffic controller had failed to notify the
pilot of the Bonanza that a Cessna 180 was on a straight-in
approach preparing to land on Runway 8 right." The Bonanza
had been cleared to land on parallel Runway 8 left behind a
Beech King Air and the DeHavilland Otter.5 7 Mistaking the
Cessna for the Otter, the pilot of the Bonanza notified the
tower that he had the Otter in sight.5 e Contrary to the con-
troller's instructions, he then turned on a base leg and col-
lided with the Otter.5
The Otter and the Bonanza were in each other's blind spot
when the collision occurred. All of the planes had appeared on
6I Id. An ILS normally consists of a localizer, glidescope, outer marker, middle
marker and approach lights. FAA Order 7110.65C, Air Traffic Control, app. 4,21
(1982).
5, 506 F.Supp. at 1229. In dicta, the court opined that the certification of the Sen-
eca aircraft, which had been challenged by plaintiffs due to cockpit visibility, was
likewise a discretionary function. Id.
I1 d. at 1227.
I, d. at 1227-28.
55 496 F. Supp. 639 (D. Colo. 1980).
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the tower Britescope radar, and were visible through the con-
trol tower window. The controller, however, did not see the
collision because his attention was diverted to other traffic.6
At trial, the United States argued that the pilots were negli-
gent in failing to "see and avoid" each other."1 Plaintiff, the
insurer of the Otter, argued that the controllers were negligent
in failing to provide positive separation between the aircraft.6 2
The court agreed and noted that one of the reasons the TCAs
were created by the FAA was the failure of the "see and
avoid" policy. Moreover, the court found that the controller
failed to utilize his Britescope correctly which caused him to
give erroneous and misleading instructions to the pilots."4
The court ruled that the controllers have a duty to give
clearance in accordance with air traffic control manuals and to
warn of dangers reasonably apparent to them even if they are
not required to do so by the manuals." The negligent breach
of the duty to issue clearances was held by the court to have
proximately caused the collision. Notwithstanding Universal
Aviation Underwriters, pilots cannot rely exclusively on the
air traffic controller to provide separation from other aircraft.
Such reliance would violate the pilot's duty to "see and
avoid."
Teicher v. United States," arose out of the mid-air collision
of a Golden West DeHavilland Twin Otter and a Cessna 150
outside the Los Angeles TCA. The area of the accident was
one where crossing north-south traffic disappeared from the
radar due to tangential effect. The court stated that "it is not
known whether the pilots of the Golden West Flight 261 re-
lied upon the air traffic controller to provide separation from
known or unknown traffic, but if the pilots did rely exclusively
" Id. at 647.
01 Id. at 649.
I d. at 641.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 647-48. Both aircraft were in compliance with air traffic control instruc-
tions and neither pilot could see and avoid the other because each was in the other's
blindspot. Therefore, neither pilot was held negligent. Id.
" Id. at 650.
15 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,533 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
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upon the traffic controller, they had no right to do so." 7 The
pilots were familiar with the type of traffic in the area and
knew there might be traffic outside the Los Angeles TCA. The
court held that the pilots of both planes should have seen
each other's aircraft in time to avoid the collision and thus,
were negligent in failing to "see and avoid" one another.6 8
There is a growing trend in comparative negligence states to
find both the air traffic controllers and the pilots liable for
mid-air collisions. As previously stated, Rudelson v. United
States," involved a collision between a Cessna 150 and a
Piper Colt aircraft one mile south of the Santa Monica control
tower under VFR conditions. The court held that the United
States was twenty percent at fault because the controllers
failed to scan the entry corridor area of the downwind leg of
the traffic pattern for Runway 21 during a two minute period
immediately preceding the collision. If the controllers had
scanned the area, they would have seen that the planes were
in imminent peril and could have warned the pilots in time to
prevent the collision.7 0 The court held that the pilot of the
Piper Colt aircraft was forty-five percent at fault because he
entered the traffic pattern unannounced and failed to "see
and avoid" the Cessna aircraft.7 ' The pilot of the Cessna 150
was found thirty-five percent at fault for failing to maintain
reasonable vigilence so as to avoid colliding with the Piper
Aircraft.7
As illustrated through the discussion of the cases above, the
defense of a lawsuit arising out of the mid-air collision in
TCA's and TRSA's remains difficult. Britescope radar pro-
vides extensive tracking of planes within a TCA or TRSA,
making it easier for controllers to monitor planes' positions.
Therefore, there is little justification for failing to maintain
positive separation between aircraft operating within these
areas.
"7 Id. at 17,544.
" Id. at 17,542.
- 602 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1979).
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III. UNITED STATES LIABILITY FOR MID-AIR COLLISIONS
BETWEEN PLANES OPERATING UNDER VISUAL FLIGHT RULES.
Most mid-air collisions occur during daylight hours in good
VFR weather conditions. The liability of the United States for
mid-air collisions between VFR aircraft in VFR weather con-
ditions is generally nominal. The pilot, and not the air traffic
controller, has the primary responsibility for preventing colli-
sions between aircraft operating under VFR in VFR weather
conditions.73 Any duties that the controllers have in this envi-
ronment are purely secondary. 4
In Coatney v. Berkshire,3 two aircraft collided one and
one-half miles from Fairfax Airport in clear weather with visi-
bility of fifteen miles. The principal allegation of negligence
against the United States was that the controller failed to
warn either pilot of the converging courses of their aircraft.
The court found that because the pilots were operating within
the Fairfax Airport traffic area, they had a duty to remain in
radio contact with the controller and to monitor transmissions
on the tower radio frequency. Although the controller was re-
sponsible for establishing the sequence of arriving and depart-
ing aircraft, he was not expected to give constant and exact
traffic information to all aircraft in the airport traffic area. 6
The court's decision was based on its finding that there was
nothing in the record to indicate that the air traffic controller
in the exercise of ordinary care should have observed the pilot
in a "position of imminent peril" at any time prior to the
accident. 77
In Hamilton v. United States,8 the court determined that
73 Coatney v. Beckshire, 500 F.2d 290, 292 (8th Cir. 1974).
71 Hamilton v. United States, 497 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1974).
76 500 F.2d 290 (8th Cir. 1974).
76 Id. at 292.
77 Id. at 293.
18 497 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1974). The case arose out of the mid-air collision of a
Piper Apache with a Cessna 310 approximately one-half mile from the threshold of
Runway 27 at Oakland Airport, Oakland, California. Both aircraft had been cleared
for straight-in approaches to Runway 27. The Apache was given the approximate po-
sition of the Cessna by the tower. When the Apache was a mile from the runway it
was cleared to land on Runway 27 right after the pilot reported that he did not have
the Cessna in sight. Id. at 372-74.
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ideally a controller should warn of impending dangers as well
as give instructions to prevent accidents. The court noted,
however, that when a controller must make a split-second de-
cision, it is more important that he try to give instructions to
avoid the collision than to warn the pilots that an emergency
exists. 9 Quoting United States v. Miller,80 the court stated:
"it 'would be erroneous' to conclude that the controllers have
the primary responsibility for controlling aircraft so as to pre-
vent collisions. ' 81 The court also noted that, "a pilot is in a far
better position to look for other traffic than the controller. '82
Although the duty to exercise due care in aircraft navigation
at airports is a concurrent one, resting on both air traffic con-
trollers and pilots, the court determined that, under VFR con-
ditions, the ultimate responsibility for the safe operation of
the aircraft should rest with pilots, regardless of the air traffic
clearance.8 3 Observing that an air traffic controller "is not
supposed to give his attention to any one aircraft in the con-
trol zone if other aircraft are present, ' 84 the court held that a
controller will not be held negligent for turning his attention
to other aircraft within the control zone, if he reasonably be-
lieves that the pilot is carrying out his instructions.8
Other courts have adopted the court's holding in Hamil-
ton.86 Thibodeaux v. United States87 involved a VFR mid-air
collision between a Piper Cherokee and a Cessna 150. After
taking off on Runway 22, at Pounds Field in Tyler, Texas, the
Cessna continued climbing through the downwind leg of the
runway. The collision occurred shortly after the Cherokee
turned onto the downwind leg of runway 22. The Cherokee
had failed to give a position report five miles south of the air-
79 Id. at 376.
*' 303 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
81 Hamilton v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 426, 431-32 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
82 Id.
88 497 F.2d at 374. See also Tilley v. United States, 375 F.2d 678, 682, 684 (4th Cir.
1967); United States v. Schultetus, 277 F.2d 322, 328 (5th Cir. 1960).
497 F.2d at 376, citing, Franklin v. United States, 342 F.2d 581, 585 (7th Cir.
1965).
88 497 F.2d at 376.
" Id.
87 14 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,653 (E.D. Tex. 1976), aff'd (unreported), (5th Cir. 1978).
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port, as requested by the tower.
The court observed that Federal Aviation Regulations88 re-
quire pilots to maintain vigilance, so as to "see and avoid"
other aircraft whenever weather conditions permit, regardless
of whether the flight is being conducted under VFR or IFR.8
The court also noted that pilots of aircraft operating under
VFR within an airport traffic area are in a better position
than local controllers to see other aircraft and to evaluate po-
tential collision hazards.90
Because controllers are not required to issue advisories
under VFR and may be unable to do so because of other du-
ties, the court concluded that pilots should not rely on an ex-
pectation of traffic advisories from controllers in order to sep-
arate themselves from other aircraft" in an airport traffic
area. Thus, under VFR conditions the responsiblity of sepa-
rating aircraft in flight rests with the pilots regardless of
whether operations are being conducted within an airport
traffic area served by a control tower.'2
The FAA air traffic controller's duty to warn pilots of po-
tential mid-air collisions centers on the pilot's and the con-
troller's knowledge of the facts material to the safe operation
of the airplane. In earlier decisions which emphasized the ulti-
mate responsibilities of the pilot, the courts considered
whether or not the controller's warnings to the pilot of mate-
rial facts were sufficient and timely. In United States v.
Miller,'3 the controllers failed to provide a warning to two air-
planes which converged in the landing pattern at a ninety de-
gree angle, resulting in a mid-air collision. The tower control-
lers did not see the airplanes as they converged. One plane
was climbing, the other plane was descending. Although the
district court held that the negligence of the controller in the
tower proximately caused the accident, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, and held that the pilot was
" 14 C.F.R. § 91.67(a) (1982).




303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963).
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contributorily negligent."' The court stated that pilots are pri-
marily responsible for controlling their aircraft, so as to pre-
vent collisions under VFR conditions.95 Further, the court
found that the pilot's duty was not relieved by the presence of
the controllers in the tower.e6 The court determined that the
pilot's failure to clear the area visually before entering the
downwind leg of the traffic pattern constituted a violation of
the right-of-way rules. This failure was determined to have
been the proximate cause of the accident.
97
Similiarly, in United States v. Schultetus,9e the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a district court decision
which held the government liable for the negligence of air
traffic controllers. Prior to the VFR mid-air head-on collision,
the tower controller asked the pilot of one plane if he had the
other plane in sight. After the pilot affirmed visual contact
with the other aircraft, the controller warned the pilot of the
first plane that the Cessna was crossing in front of it.ee The
court held that the controller's warning to the pilot discharged
the United States of any liability for the collision.100 The
court noted that there may be greater duty and responsibility
upon the control tower to aircraft operating under IFR, and in
such a situation a lesser responsibility rests upon the pilot.101
In Union Trust Co. v. United States,10s one of the earliest
cases involving a mid-air collision, the court found that the air
" Id. at 711.
I d. at 710.
Id. at 710-11.
9 Id. at 711.
98 277 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1960).
" Id. at 326.
"00 Id. at 327.
101 Id. at 328.
When flying in instrument flight rules weather conditions, it is obvi-
ously impossible for the pilot to assume the responsibility of avoiding
collision with other aircraft except as directed by the ground control
agency. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that all clearances
issued by a control tower to pilots of aircraft under its jurisdiction be
adequately concise and definite inasmuch as the pilot has no other
means of ascertaining the proximity of other aircraft.
Id. at 327 (quoting SPEIZER, PREPARATION MANUAL FOR AVIATION NEGLIGENCE CASES
397).
,01 113 F. Supp. 80 (D.D.C. 1953).
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traffic controller's attempts to warn of an imminent mid-air
collision were inadequate and held the United States liable for
the controller's negligence. The accident occurred when a Bo-
livian airplane collided with an Eastern Airlines airplane
while both airplanes were executing final landing approaches
to Washington National Airport in Virginia. The controller
did not observe that the Bolivian airplane was above and be-
hind the Eastern airplane until after he had authorized both
planes to land on the same runway. After repeated attempts
to warn the descending Bolivian airplane that it did not have
the right-of-way, the controller instructed the Eastern airline
to turn left. The mid-air collision occurred almost simultane-
ously with this instruction. The court found that the control-
ler negligently cleared both airplanes to land on the same run-
way at approximately the same time, failed to warn either
pilot of the other's approach, and failed to keep both pilots
advised of the location of the other plane. 03
Several recent decisions have held that the duty to prevent
a VFR mid-air collision rests with both pilots and air traffic
controllers.' In Mattschei v. United States,0 3 the court
stressed that "!the duty to exercise due care to avoid accidents
is a concurrent one resting on both the control tower person-
nel and the pilot."' 0 The case involved a mid-air collision in
VFR conditions between a Cessna and a Cherokee airplane
while both were approaching Hayward California Airport for
landing. The planes were in touch with different traffic con-
trollers on separate radio channels. The court found that the
controllers were negligent in failing to warn the Cessna pilot
that another plane was above and behind him.10 7 At trial the
controller testified that there is always a possibility of a mid-
air collision when two planes are in close proximity to one an-
other. He further explained that although he thought there
would be a "near miss" between the Cessna and the Cherokee,
'03 Id. at 84-85.
104 Mattschei v. United States, 600 F.2d 205, 208 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Rudelson
v. United States, 602 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir. 1979).
1o 600 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 208.
101 Id.
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he did not believe the planes would actually collide. 08 The
court concluded that the controller should have issued a traf-
fic advisory to the Cessna because the possibility of an emer-
gency or collision was imminent. 0 9 The court also held the
pilot of the Cessna seventy percent liable because he was neg-
ligent in attempting to land on the wrong runway and in fail-
ing to see and avoid the other airplane.110
Aircraft operating on different radio frequencies present ex-
tra problems in the defense of a mid-air collision. Frequently,
it cannot be shown that the planes knew of the presence of
each other through the monitoring of their radios. In Fikejs v.
Lickteig"' the court went so far as to hold that it constituted
negligence on the part of the United States to have two air-
craft operating on different frequencies while landing at the
same airport.
The Fikejs court found the air traffic controllers negligent
for failing to inform pilots of the presence of other aircraft. 1 2
The case involved the collision of a Cessna 150 and a Bell he-
licopter. At the time of the collision, both the Cessna and the
helicopter were in contact with the tower. The two aircraft,
however, were operating on separate radio frequencies and
were talking to different controllers. The Cessna had been in-
structed by the local controller to follow a Cessna 140 on a
crosswind leg"1 for Runway 17. The helicopter was cleared to
land west of Runway 17. Neither aircraft was informed of the
presence of the other aircraft.
The court stated that the United States violated its duty of
reasonable care when the controllers failed to advise the
Cessna and the helicopter of each other's presence in the same
immediate airspace.' 4 Although prudence requires coordina-
108 Id.
109 Id.
Id. at 207. See also Hamilton v. United States, 497 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1974) and
United States v. Miller, 303 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1962) (duty to avoid accidents rests in
both control tower personnel and the pilot).
" Fikejs v. Lickteig, 13 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,657 (D. Kan. 1975).
:12 Id.
13 A crosswind leg is "[a) flight path at right angles to the landing runway off to
upwind leg." FAA Order 7110.65C, Air Traffic Control, app. 4, 41 (1982).
114 In Fikejs v. Lickteig, the court stated that:
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tion between controllers handling different aircraft operating
on different radio frequencies in the same airspace, there was
no coordination between the local controller handling the
Cessna and the ground controller handling the helicopter. Ad-
ditionally, the ground controller failed to specifically ascertain
the location of the helicopter before giving it clearance to
land.11 After finding no negligence or contributory negligence
on the part of the pilots, the court stated that even if the pi-
lots were negligent in failing to maintain proper vigilance,
such negligence was not the proximate cause of the
collision. 1 6
CONCLUSION
A system of air traffic control which would place the respon-
sibility of separating VFR aircraft on controllers rather than
pilots clearly would be unreliable because of the inability of
the controller to accurately determine distances and the vir-
tual impossibility of the visual search task this would impose
upon controllers. Pilots must always keep in mind their re-
sponsibility for continuously maintaining a vigilant lookout
regardless of the type of aircraft being flown. Most mid-air
collisions occur during daylight hours in good VFR weather
conditions. Controller observation of aircraft in the terminal
area is often limited by distance, depth perception, aircraft
conspicuousness and other normal visual acuity problems.
Limitations of available radar, traffic volume, controller work-
load, and unknown traffic may prevent controllers from pro-
viding timely traffic advisory information to VFR aircraft.
Moreover, traffic advisories are secondary to the controllers'
primary duty of separating aircraft under their control and is-
[t]he principal objective in air traffic control work is to insure the safe
orderly and rapid movement of aircraft through the nation's airspace.
Air traffic clearances issued by controllers are authorizations for air-
craft to proceed under specified traffic conditions within controlled air-
space. These authorizations are made for the purpose of preventing
collisions between known aircraft.
Id. at 17,658.
13 Av. Cas. at 17,661.
Id. at 17,664.
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suing safety advisories when aware of safety conflicts.
The United States is exposed to the greatest potential lia-
bility for mid-air collisions when such collisions are caused by
the failure of FAA personnel to exercise due care in separa-
tion of aircraft under IFR conditions. Liability may also arise
for mid-air collisions that occur in TCA's, Stage III, and
TRSA's because the primary objective for establishing these
areas is to provide for separation of aircraft. Under certain
circumstances, the United States may also be liable for mid-
air collisions of VFR aircraft. Pilots of aircraft, however, have
concurrent duties and responsibilities to avoid mid-air colli-
sions. They cannot rely exclusively on the air traffic control-
lers to provide separation from other aircraft. To do so would
obviously be in violation of the duty of pilots to "see and
avoid" and would place an unreasonable burden upon a deli-
cately balanced system.

